Th e aim of presented article is to evaluate ICC's case-law rendered in 2013, or more precisely, to analyze and evaluate some challenges the ICC faced in 2013. Scrutiny of the latest decisions has its obvious advantage, since it opens the door for better understanding of previous case-law. 2 Vice versa, it is obvious that current ICC's practice cannot be comprehended without the knowledge of legal background it emanates from. To put it diff erently, an analysis of the case-law from 2013 presupposes to reveal its roots which are embedded in previous years. Th is holds true with respect to all considered and selected issues -cooperation with the Court, complementarity, witness proofi ng, or presence at trial.
Cooperation with the Court
Famous metaphor describes international criminal tribunals as giants without arms and legs, 3 which are entirely dependent on the cooperation provided by the States or international organizations. Th e ICC is not an exception. 4 With respect to cooperation with the ICC, especially two aspects attracted present author's attention. Firstly, it is the continuous eff ort to arrest current president of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir (1.1) and secondly, the ongoing detention of witnesses from the DRC who applied for asylum in the Netherlands (1.2) and got struck in a "legal limbo". 
Al-Bashir and the ICC -Tag Game, Hide-and-Seek…or Rather Blind Man's Bluff ?
Despite considerable eff ort to arrest current president of Sudan, Omar AlBashir, the simple fact remains that he is still at large. During 2013, the ICC [cit. 2013-12-12 ]. Available at: http://www.sharesproject.nl/the-legal-limbo-continuesupdate-on-the-detained-witnesses-at-the-icc/ issued eight (judicial) decisions concerning arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir which were addressed both to State Parties (Chad, Nigeria) and non-State Parties (Libya, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, Kuwait) to the ICC Statute. 6 Th e crucial issue here at stake is, whether the ICC may demand arrest and surrender of serving head of state, which is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. Th is issue incorporates two aspects: (a) personal immunity of a head of State; (b) execution of an order to arrest and surrender a head of State. Before the latest case-law shall be analyzed, it is necessary to set default axioms concerning both examined issues.
Th ese questions attracted considerable attention among scholars, especially aft er issuance of two arrest warrants and two decisions pursuant to Article 87(7) of the ICC Statute on the refusal of Chad and Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court. 7 It is not surprising that doctrinal opinions here are substantially divided. According to P. Gaeta, Al-Bashir cannot rely on the Head of States immunity before the ICC, because under customary international law personal immunities are not bar to prosecution before international criminal courts. 8 It is possible to refer to famous Arrest Warrant case, where the International Court of Justice (hereaft er "ICJ) stated that "an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Aff airs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. " 9 Neverthe- Self-confi dent proclamation of the ICC that "the current position of Omar Al-Bashir as Head of a state which is not a party to the Statute, has no eff ect on the Court's jurisdiction over the present case" 11 seems to be at least controversial -inapplicability of personal immunities before international criminal courts is far from being settled in customary international law.
12 To employ comparison of W. Schabas: if there is no immunity for current Head of States before international tribunals, would it be possible for the Czech Republic and Slovakia to establish international tribunal which would assert jurisdiction over the President of Germany?
13 Defi nitively not! To conclude, it seems to be more persuasive that current customary international law does not provide exception Th ere is an agreement among scholars that obligation of cooperation can emanate from source of law other than the ICC Statute -a Security Council resolution. 21 Nevertheless, the resolution referring situation in Darfur to the ICC does not provide for this duty -it merely urges all States to cooperate fully. If draft ers of the resolution have had a duty of cooperation in mind, they would have defi nitively used obligatory language (shall cooperate). Th erefore, States (to be a State Party or a non-State Party to the ICC Statute -with exception of Sudan) cannot be forced to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir, because such obligation is provided for neither in the ICC Statute, nor in the 1593 Security Council resolution. With these conclusions in mind, it is now possible to comment on decisions rendered in 2013.
Th e fi rst decision deals with Al-Bashir's travel to Chad and Libya. 22 With respect to Chad, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that Chad as a State Party is under obligation to execute pending Court's decision concerning arrest and surrender ( §10). With respect to Libya which is a non-State Party, the ICC indicated that obligations of cooperation are not so straightforward, nevertheless it stressed that Libya is still urged by the 1593 Security Council resolution to cooperate fully with the Court ( § 13). Obligations of Chad were reiterated in the second decision ( § 12), where the ICC demanded explanation of failure to arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir during his visit in Chad. 23 In the next decision, the ICC made use of Article 87 (7) It seems that obligation of cooperation would be met where a State Party at least reply for the ICC's request -that was a case with Nigeria which argued that "Al-Bashir was not invited to undertake a visit to Nigeria, rather he appeared in Nigeria ostensibly to attend the special Summit of the African Union. " 25 Due to sudden departure of Al-Bashir the necessary steps, corresponding with Nigeria's international obligations, could not have been taken. Th e ICC satisfi ed itself with this reasoning.
Last three decisions dealt with potential travel to territories of non-State Parties (Libya, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Kuwait). In all three decisions, the ICC stressed that only State Parties to the Statute are under obligation to cooperate with the Court. Non-State Parties, which are Members of the UN, can be undertaken to cooperation by the Security Council resolution. Nevertheless, all three decisions reveal that the ICC is aware of rather vague formulation concerning obligation to cooperation addressed to non-State Parties of the ICC Statute, which is included in the 1593 resolution.
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To conclude, according to this author's opinion, it is very improbable that Al-Bashir will be surrendered to the Court while holding his offi ce. Firstly, there is a strong disagreement with extending the ICC's jurisdiction over incumbent Heads of States holding their offi ces in non-State Parties to the ICC Statute. Arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir is currently precluded by Article 98 of the ICC Statute, or rather it is made dependent on previous waiver of immunity by Sudan. Support for arrest and surrender cannot be found even in the 1593 resolution, due to its ambiguous language. Finally, one cannot forget immunities enjoyed by Sudanese President as a representative of State at international fora (e.g. Article 105 of the UN Charter, Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations). Th e situation might alter once AlBashir will leave his offi ce, what might occur aft er the next presidential elections in Sudan which will take place in 2015. Until that time it seems that the ICC will play blind man's bluff with scarf over its eyes. 
Detention of witnesses
In 2011 four witnesses, prosecuted and held in custody in the DRC, were transferred to the ICC to testify on behalf of defense in Lubanga and Katanga cases. Th e conditions of transfer and return to their home State were specifi ed in a special cooperation agreement concluded between the ICC and the DRC pursuant to Article 93(7) of the ICC Statute. Aft er completion of testimony the witnesses should have been returned to the DRC, however, they all applied for asylum in the Netherlands, claiming imperilment by the DRC authorities on account of their testimony. 27 Th is complex situation triggered dispute between the DRC, the ICC and the Netherlands, which was considered by domestic (Dutch) courts, the ICC and the European Court of Human Rights (hereaft er "ECHR"). 28 No defi nitive result has been achieved yet -three witnesses from Katanga case still fi nd themselves in a situation which was accurately described as "legal limbo". 29 Th is situation may pose threat to eff ective cooperation between the Court and State Parties -despite the terms of bilateral cooperation agreement and assurances of return, the witnesses are still (aft er almost three years) in the Court's custody, it is therefore suitable to briefl y discuss it here.
Detention of witnesses claiming the asylum in the Netherlands creates an unprecedented situation before the Court. 30 Draft ers of the Statute did not foresee this scenario -clearly, there is a lacuna both in primary and secondary sources of law applicable before the ICC. 31 Accordingly, the Netherlands holds the position that witnesses should remain in the Court's custody during asylum proceedings, it does not consider itself obliged to receive these witnesses. On the other hand, the DRC insists on their immediate return as all witnesses face criminal prosecution in the DRC which had to be temporarily discontinued.
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Despite manifest unease the witnesses have faced from 2011, and with all regard to it, relevant decisions rendered by the ICC in this situation brought a benefi tthey provide interpretation of Article 68(1) and Article 93(7) and explain their linkage to Article 21(3). Th e last mentioned article provides that the application and interpretation of law applicable before the ICC must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.
With respect to Article 68(1), dealing with the duty to protect victims and witnesses, the Trial Chamber in Katanga case concluded that "it is not duty bound to protect witnesses against risks which they might face not only as a result of their testimony but also as a result of human rights violations by the DRC. "
33 Accordingly, the Chamber excluded application of non-refoulement principle, because as an international organization the ICC does not possess territory and therefore, it is unable to implement this principle within its ordinary meaning ( § 64) -only a State which possesses territory is able to apply the nonrefoulement. Th e Chamber went on to say that even if the ICC decided to return witnesses immediately, which would be clear violation of right to apply for asylum and right to eff ective remedy, the only entity responsible for violation of non-refoulement principle would be the Netherlands ( § 73).
With respect to Article 93(7), the same Chamber ruled that this provision encompasses a twin obligation: obligation of immediate return and obligation of continuous detention.
34 Th e ICC came to conclusion that obligation of immediate return has to be suspended in present situation, on the foundation of Article 21(3) of the Statute -otherwise right to apply for asylum, right to eff ective remedy and non-refoulement principle would be breached. Th e Chamber went on to stress that non-refoulement principle is a peremptory norm of international law.
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With respect to obligation of continuous detention, the decision provided that 31 the ICC is not entitled to review witnesses' detention, because it was ordered by the DRC. Th e Chamber concluded that "there is no impediment to application of Article 93(7) in accordance with internationally recognized human rights. "
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Continued detention did not violate human rights, because, as the Court reasoned, the right to liberty is subject to numerous restrictions and cannot be considered a peremptory norm of international law.
To summarize these decisions, the Court ruled it cannot return witnesses to the DRC, because that would be a violation of human rights, but at the same time it stressed that continuous detention, lasting almost three years, is in conformity with human rights standards. At the very begin, there is a discrepancy in the Court's reasoning. In 2011 decision the ICC mentioned that non-refoulement, one of the leading principles in area of human rights, is inapplicable with respect to Article 68(1), but it admitted its application in relation to Article 93(7). Th is conclusion is debatable as every single part of the Statute is subjected to Article 21(3) and must conform to international human rights. Further, author of this article does not agree with the Court's conclusion reached in 2013 decision according to which continuous detention of witnesses from the DRC conforms to international human rights law. Firstly, it seems that the Court limited referential framework of Article 21(3) to jus cogens which is clearly contrary to what this provision expressly provides for. 37 Th en, it is at least controversial to assert that non-refoulement is a norm of peremptory character. 38 Finally, with respect to continued detention, it is disputable that international human rights law does not establish any legal impediment here. Enough is to refer to case-law of the Human Rights Committee, according to which "every decision to keep a person in detention should be open to review periodically so that the grounds justifying the detention can be assessed. "
39 Th e detention of three witnesses from the DRC has never been meritoriously reviewed -decisions rendered by the ICC only declared lack of competence and found any request for review inadmissible. To conclude, as the ICC suspended the obligation to return, it should have suspended also obligation of detention and should have decided about release of the witnesses to the Netherlands as the Host State. that their lives and freedoms would not be threatened in the DRC, the ICC would be bound according to Article 93(7) to return these witnesses immediately to the DRC. Second, if the Dutch authorities granted asylum or decided that witnesses' return would violate non-refoulement principle, the Court would transfer them to the Dutch authorities. 41 Nevertheless, due to considerable length of asylum procedure in the Netherlands, the third option is at stake. As the Court cannot detain witnesses indefi nitely, it should consider releasing of the detainees to the territory of the Netherlands even before completion of the asylum proceedings. As described above, such an approach would be in conformity with international human right obligations the Court accepted to respect and is therefore preferable.
Th e gap in the law applicable before the ICC has infl icted serious problems and might have adverse repercussions even for future practice of the Court. Th e situation around the witnesses from the DRC can negatively infl uence a willingness of the State Parties to transfer witnesses to Th e Hague and undermine obligation of cooperation with the ICC. Despite enormous eff ort on the side of the DRC to bring witnesses back, the option that they will never return is still open. Th e Netherlands as the Host State might be afraid of increase in asylum requests -it will be only seen whether Congolese case was sporadic and isolated situation, or whether other precedents will follow. Th ere is no doubt that agreement concerning this topic concluded at least between the ICC and the Netherlands would be of much help here.
Complementarity
One of the most important decision rendered by the ICC in 2013 concerns admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, chief of Libyan intelligence during Gadaffi era.
42 Th e ICC ruled in favor of Libya and decided that the case against Al-Senussi were inadmissible. Th is decision crowns long-lasting eff ort of Libyan authorities to prosecute and punish Al-Senussi before domestic courts which was revealed soon aft er issuance of arrest warrant by the ICC against him in 2011. 44 Th e Court endowed with jurisdiction may decide about inadmissibility of the case if condition of complementarity, double jeopardy or insuffi cient gravity is fulfi lled. 45 Admissibility decision in Al-Sennussi case provides so far the most topical interpretation of Article 17(1)(a) concerning the complementarity. According to consistent jurisprudence of the ICC, confi rmed even by the Appeals Chamber, decision on complementarity contemplates a two-step test: (a) whether the proceedings at national level covers the same case as before the ICC; (b) whether the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out such investigation or prosecution. 46 Th e "same case" demand is subdivided into two items: the same person and substantially the same conduct.
47 Th e Chamber confi rmed previous ICC's caselaw and stressed that legal qualifi cation of conduct is not relevant, therefore domestic investigation and prosecution for ordinary crimes (i.e. not international crimes) is considered to be suffi cient as long as it covers the same conduct.
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Domestic investigation and prosecution must neither encompass all events and incidents described in the arrest warrant decision, nevertheless, it is important that "particularly violent or […] signifi cantly representative" 49 events are covered at national level. Aft er evaluation of investigation steps taken by competent Libyan authorities, the ICC found the fi rst part of complementarity principle to be satisfi ed.
of the request for arrest and surrender of Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to article 95 of the Rome Statute and related Defence request to refer Libya to the UN Security Council, PTCH I, 14 June 2013. In this decision the ICC ruled that Libya, pursuant to Article 95 of the Statute, had a right to postpone the execution of the surrender request pending determination of the admissibility challenge. Th is decision is of the utmost importance for ruling on the admissibility of the case -the Chamber concluded that admissibility challenge was properly made, and especially, the requirement of its presentation "at the earliest opportunity" provided for in Article 19(5) was met ( § 33). Nevertheless, the Chamber neglected the fact that the admissibility challenge was presented only seven months aft er extradition of Al-Senussi from Mauretania to Libya and failed to explain, why seven months period still satisfi es the requirement of the earliest opportunity. With respect to the second limb, the Chamber asserted that willingness and ability to carry out domestic proceedings against an accused (Al-Senussi) must be assessed in light of the relevant law and procedures applicable to domestic proceedings in Libya.
50 Th e Pre-Trial Chamber next considered argument of defense which called attention to irregularities in due process (unjustifi ed delay, lack of legal representation, lack of independence and impartiality). Th e Chamber emphasized that alleged violations of the accused's procedural rights are not per se grounds for a fi nding of unwillingness or inability under Article 17 of the Statute. According to the Chamber, potential irregularities in the process would be relevant, only if they were motivated by intent to shield person from criminal responsibility, or by intent not to bring this person to justice (Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute). 51 Considering steps taken by Libyan authorities, the Court was unable to make any such conclusion, quite contrary, it concluded that Libya is both willing and able to investigate and prosecute Al-Senussi, and therefore found the second part of the complementarity principle to be fulfi lled. In light of these fi ndings, the ICC decided that the case against Al-Senussi is inadmissible before the Court.
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Th e admissibility decision in Al-Senussi case should be praised for adoption of material rather than formal approach in relation to the requirement of the same conduct. It does not insist on specifi c legal qualifi cation of the criminal conduct (i.e. qualifi cation as international crimes), which correctly refl ects a margin of appreciation States have with respect to prosecution of international crimes before domestic courts. On the other hand, the ICC totally disregarded discrepancies in domestic proceedings, especially lack of Al-Senussi's legal representation before Libyan authorities. Th ere is some support for usage of case-law of human rights treaty bodies and courts in the assessment of complementarity, which case-law undoubtedly provides for the requirement of legal representation in criminal proceedings, nevertheless, the ICC limited referential framework of its review only to domestic (Libyan) law. 53 At the same time, it should be admitted that according to Article 17 of the ICC Statute, not every procedural 50 Ibid, § 203. 51 Ibid, § 221. 52 Th e admissibility decision was appealed by the defense. In the next course of the proceedings, the ICC refused to grant suspensive eff ect to this appeal. Th e defense requested suspension of domestic proceedings until deliverance of the fi nal judgment on the appeal before the ICC -it argued inter alia by danger of imposition of death penalty in Libya, which would cause irreparable harm to the accused. Nevertheless, the ICC found that there is no obstacle for continuation of proceedings before domestic courts. irregularity is relevant for the assessment of complementarity. Th e Statute takes into account only those violations of procedural rights which cast doubt upon genuine will or intent of a State to bring an accused to justice. Here, the Chamber's opinion is correct one.
Still, the Chamber failed to consider (in)consistency of this ruling with its own previous decision on admissibility of the case against Saif Gadaffi , rendered in May 2013. 54 In Gadaffi case, the same Chamber, composed of the same judges, decided that the case against Gadaffi is admissible before the ICC. Here, the Chamber justifi ed its ruling inter alia by lack of legal representation: "this important diffi culty [in securing a lawyer] appears to be an impediment to the progress of proceedings against Mr Gaddafi . If this impediment is not removed, a trial cannot be conducted. " 55 One simply cannot understand, why is missing legal representation, described as an impediment for trial in one (Gadaffi ) case, almost irrelevant aspect in the second (Al-Senussi) case decided only few months later. Last but not least, the ICC did not explain suffi ciently, why it disregarded the fact that the admissibility request was presented as late as seven months aft er transfer of Al-Senussi to Libya. Th e ICC turned blind eyes to Article 19(5) of the ICC Statute.
Procedural Issues
Following part deals with challenges the ICC faced in area of international criminal procedure. Present article focuses on issue of witness proofi ng (3.1) and presence of accused at trial (3.2). Chosen procedural aspects are illustrative examples of extensive interpretation of the ICC Statute, or even examples of judicial creativity.
Witness proofi ng
Witness proofi ng (or witness preparation) is defi ned as "a meeting between a witness and the party calling that witness, taking place shortly before the witness's testimony, for the purpose of discussing matters relating to the witness's testimony."
56 Application and interpretation of this legal institute provides an example of extensive interpretation of the ICC Statute. It also sheds some light on mutual relation between diff erent fi rst-instance chambers (i.e. Trial and Pre- 58 Witness proofing was not admitted in any of these cases, primarily by reason of missing regulation in the ICC Statute. Argumentation of the Prosecutor, referring to settled practice of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, was repeatedly rejected. Th e Trial Chamber in Lubanga case e.g. ruled that practice of ad hoc tribunals does not have precedential value and therefore is not binding on the ICC.
59 Th e Trial Chamber decided that "the Chamber does not consider the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals to be automatically applicable to the ICC without detailed analysis."
60 Th e Chamber consequently reasoned why it would not take the practice of other international criminal tribunals into account: the ICC established procedural framework which diff ers signifi cantly from frameworks of its predecessors -one can mention principle of objectivity, according to which prosecution should investigate both incriminatory and exculpatory evidence (Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute), or accentuated position of victims in the proceedings (Article 75 of the ICC Statute).
Position of witness proofi ng was revised in 2013 -or more precisely, recent case-law off ered alterative interpretation of relevant provisions in the ICC Statute. Th e Trial Chamber in Ruto case determined that witness proofi ng implicitly follows from Article 64 of the ICC Statute. Th e Trial Chamber pointed "that silence on a particular procedural issue does not necessarily imply that it is forbidden. Article 64 is formulated so as to give judges a signifi cant degree of discretion concerning the procedures they adopt". 61 Consequently, the decision referred to practice of ad hoc tribunals which approved the witness preparation, although their statutes and procedural rules are equally silent on this issue. Th e Trial Chamber concluded that although the jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals is 57 NERLICH, Volker. Th e status of ICTY and ICTR precedent in proceedings before the ICC.
In: STAHN, Carsten, SLUITER, Göran. Pro-active approach taken in this decision should be welcomed. Not only the Trial Chamber adopted fl exible extensive interpretation of the ICC Statute, at the same time it took into consideration rich storeroom of case-law developed by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, with full awareness of position it occupies within the system of applicable law before the ICC. Finally, the decision confi rms that Trial Chambers and Pre-Trial Chambers are not bound by previous holdings of other fi rst-instance chambers. Unfortunately, recent decision of the Trial Chamber V need not be followed in other cases -the witness proofi ng need not be allowed here at all.
Presence at trial
During 2013, the ICC was kept busy in connection with presence at trial of accused Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto, both being prosecuted for their alleged participation in the Kenyan post-election violence 2007-2008. Both accused pointed out to their public duties at the highest national level and asked the Court for exemption from their continuous presence during the trial. Th is might have been considered at fi rst sight a trivial issue, but it turned to be quite complicated legal problem at the end.
Th e fi rst relevant decision was rendered in June 2013.
63 Th e key issue here was interpretation of Article 63(1) of the ICC Statute according to which "[t] he accused shall be present during the trial. "
64 Unsurprisingly, defense of the accused argued that Article 63 does not require obligatory presence, because it is a right of an accused. On the other hand, the Prosecutor relied on grammatical interpretation of Article 63 (shall be present) and argued in favor of duty of accused person to be present during trial. Th e Trial Chamber took somewhat middle approach. It came to the conclusion that aforesaid article imposes duty of presence only upon accused, but not upon the Chamber ( § § 42-43). In exceptional situations, the Chamber may therefore exercise its discretion to excuse an accused person, on a case-by-case basis, from his/her continuous presence at the trial ( § 49). Supportively, the Chamber argued by recognition of democracy ( § 79) -here with reference to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to the Chamber, President and Deputy President of Kenya were elected in democratic elections and should be allowed to exercise their mandates -duty of their continuous presence at the trial would be clearly incompatible with will of Kenyan people expressed in elections. Aft er all, the 62 Chamber, within its discretion, enumerated specifi ed hearings where physical presence of accused is obligatory ( § 104). Identical line of reasoning and conclusion was adopted by the Trial Chamber in Kenyatta case. 65 In October 2013, decision in Ruto case was reversed by the ICC's Appeals Chamber. 66 Th e Appeals Chamber agreed that Article 63(1) of the ICC Statute did not operate as an absolute bar in all circumstances to the continuation of trial proceedings in the absence of the accused. Nevertheless, it ruled that the fi rst instance had not exercised its discretion properly. Th e Appeals Chamber reformulated, in more general manner, conditions for excusal of the presence. 67 In the light of appellate decision, the Trial Chamber in Kenyatta case reconsidered its previous holding and adjusted conditions for excuse of presence to those formulated by the Appeals Chamber. 68 Two separate articles of the ICC Statute deal with the presence of an accused at trial. While Article 67 speaks about the right of an accused to be present, Article 63 was interpreted by the Ruto Trial Chamber as provision prescribing duty of accused to be present. 69 Crucial question is, whether presence of accused at trial can be both a duty and a right of an accused? According to the opinion of present author, the ICC failed to explain mutual relation of these two provisions. One may wonder, why an accused as a holder of right to be present at trial would be obliged to submit request to the Trial Chamber to be excused from it. Does it mean that accused has the right, but is deprived of any disposition with it? Interestingly, what is missing in all four decisions is any reference to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute, which subjects application and interpretation of the ICC Statute to internationally recognized human rights, despite the fact that international human rights jurisprudence describes presence at trial as a right, which might be waived. 70 Conformity of Article 63 with Article 67 and Article 21(3) is here at stake. Moreover, all decisions follow the line of judicial creativity. For example, W. Schabas critically commented on conditions of excusal established by the Appeals Chamber. 71 Similar objection was raised by the Prosecutor. 72 Finally, according to the opinion of present author, the Appeals Chamber might have expressly ruled that its fi ndings were binding even on other Trial and Pre-Trial Chambers, i.e. those considering diff erent case than that which is under appeal. 73 It had suitable opportunity to do so. It would be appropriate approach with regard to judicial economy, of course subject to due justifi cation as binding force of appellate decisions is not provided for in the ICC Statute -at the present state of ICC' case-law, the fi rst instance has to choose between granting leave to appeal and reconsideration of its previous decision.
Rulings on presence of Kenyan President and Deputy President at trial before the ICC were impatiently awaited. Th e ICC was confronted with considerable political pressure from Kenya, and more generally from the African Union (hereaft er "AU"). In October 2013, the AU convened extraordinary session, which inter alia inquired into the relationship between Africa and the ICC. As one commentator aptly expressed, the worst scenario that many feared and talked about, i.e. withdrawal of African States from the ICC Statute, did not occurred, but once again strong political disagreement with the ICC resonated through the summit. 74 In November 2013, Kenya initiated adoption of draft resolution
Conclusion
Analyzed decisions of the ICC rendered in 2013 are far from being clear and unproblematic. Th e author of present article presented disagreement with the Court's approach towards prosecution of current Sudanese President Al-Bashir. Author concluded that the ICC lacks jurisdiction in this case and is therefore precluded to request Al-Bashir arrest and surrender both in relation to State Parties and non-State Parties to the ICC Statute. Next, the ICC was criticized for maintaining the legal limbo concerning detention of the witnesses from the DRC. Th e other objection pointed to inconsistency of decisions rendered by the same chamber (composed of the same judges) in the same question (relevance of lack of legal representation of an accused in the assessment of the complementarity under Article 17 of the ICC Statute). Th e ICC (or at least its particular chambers) should put emphasis on consistency of its decision making practice -principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations require that the same questions should be decided identically and accordingly, any departure should be persuasively reasoned. Finally, with respect to procedural aspect (presence of an accused at trial), the question was implicated, how far should the judicial creativity and expansive interpretation of the ICC Statute be extended.
All analyzed questions (possibly with exception of witness proofi ng) have posed considerable challenge for the ICC and the Court may be rightfully criticized for approach it has taken in its decisions. Nevertheless, as these questions represent only fragment of current ICC's case-law -this articles naturally did not endeavor to assess ICC's activity in a broader perspective, any possible opinions condemning the ICC as such would be defi nitively wrong, precipitated and premature. Accordingly, the ICC still has a right to protection, even if it has already come of age.
